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Eleonore Stump’s innumerable contributions to philosophy of religion, 
Th omism, and Christian thought more generally receive a fi tting tribute 
in this impressive collection of fourteen essays. Th e works are invariably 
clear and well-written. A number of them interact with Stump’s own recent 
and past works, and many succeed in making original contributions to 
important debates. I cannot hope to summarize them all here, and will 
instead attempt a representative sampling of what is on off er.
Peter van Inwagen leads off  with “God and Other Uncreated Th ings.” 
He argues that there are abstract objects, at least some of which are real 
even though not created by God or causally dependent on Him. One 
implication van Inwagen draws from this is a theological one: when the 
Nicene Creed proclaims that God is creator of all things, both visible and 
invisible, this must be interpreted as allowing for an implicit restriction 
to concrete entities. 
He fi rst gives an argument for the independence of abstracta based 
on a theory of properties that he has developed in detail elsewhere. 
According to this view, a property is similar to a proposition, in that they 
are both things that are assertible. But they diff er in that a proposition is 
a ‘saturated’ assertible; it can be asserted without qualifi cation. One can 
simply assert the proposition that the earth goes around the sun. But 
a property is an unsaturated assertible. It always requires qualifi cation, 
because a property can only be asserted of something. So, “a property of 
something x, a property that x has or instantiates or exemplifi es, I say, is 
simply an unsaturated assertible that can be said truly of x” (p. 9). Now, 
the question of whether there are independent abstracta is closely related 
to the question of whether such abstracta can ever exist uninstantiated. 
Given his theory of properties, van Inwagen believes they can: “An 
uninstantited or unexemplifi ed property, therefore, is a thing that can 
be said of things but cannot be said truly of anything. And obviously 
there are such assertibles if there are any unsaturated assertibles at all. 
One of the things you can say about something, for example, is that it 
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is a woman who was the president of the United States in the twentieth 
century. . . . But that thing, although it can be said of things, can’t be 
said truly of anything. It is therefore an uninstantiated property, and its 
existence refutes the thesis that properties can exist only in the things 
that have them” (pp. 9-10). 
He then gives an argument for independence that he takes to be 
neutral between his own particular theory of properties and other 
such theories: “Properties and other abstract objects themselves have 
properties, and many of the properties of abstract objects could not be 
properties of concrete objects. Th e number 510 has such properties as 
being an even number and having irrational square roots, for example, 
and the property ductility has the property of being instantiated and 
the property of entailing the property solidity. It cannot be true of these 
properties – being an even number and being instantiated, and so on – 
that they exist only in the concrete objects that have them, for they are 
not had by concrete objects at all” (p. 10). Given that this is the case, God 
cannot create all abstracta by virtue of creating concrete objects. 
Van Inwagen then points out that the defender of the idea that abstracta 
depend on God could press her case in two ways: fi rst by arguing that 
God creates abstracta ex nihilo, just as He creates concrete objects. Van 
Inwagen sees this idea as strictly irrefutable but immensely implausible. 
Another option would be to stipulate that abstracta are ideas in God’s 
mind, and so causally dependent on that mind. So just as we might be 
taken to be the creators of our thoughts – or more precisely, the events 
that are our acts of thinking – so God might be seen as the creator of His 
thoughts, and hence of the abstracta that fi gure in them. But in addition 
to worries arising from what van Inwagen sees as the dubious ontological 
status of events, this account of the situation makes no progress over the 
idea that God simply creates abstracta ex nihilo. Granting that events 
are a legitimate category, and granting that God’s thoughts are events, 
such events still have abstract objects as constituents. “If thoughts have 
constituents, and if God is the creator of his thoughts, then, surely, God 
must be the creator of all the constituents of his thoughts?” (p. 16). So van 
Inwagen reaches the conclusion that at least some abstracta are necessary 
beings existing independently of any concrete entity, including God. 
In “Aquinas, Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom,” Brian Left ow 
lays out the problem of reconciling God’s freedom with His simplicity. 
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(As appropriate for a volume dedicated to Stump, about half of the 
contributions focus on some aspect of Th omistic thought.) For Aquinas, 
God is simple, such that His essence is ontologically identical with His 
will. “So if God has His essence necessarily, it seems to follow that for 
Th omas He has His actual volition necessarily. But then it seems that He 
necessarily wills what He does: that it is not possible that He do otherwise.” 
(p. 21) Th is confl icts with divine freedom. Left ow lays out some strategies 
Aquinas employs to get around this problem (which exposition includes 
a clear and helpful discussion of the relationship between Aquinas’ modal 
concepts and those employed in contemporary possible worlds analysis). 
He then engages with Stump’s own creative interpretation of Aquinas on 
this point, where she argues that the diff erences in God’s will between our 
world and other possible worlds is one in which the diff erences in divine 
volition are not real diff erences involving changes in God’s intrinsic traits 
across worlds, but only diff erences in God’s relation to extrinsic objects 
– mere Cambridge changes across possible worlds. Left ow critiques this 
proposal and puts forward one of his own, according to which there is 
a real diff erence in the content of God’s volition across possible worlds, 
and that this entails real intrinsic diff erences in God across possible 
worlds, but only minor diff erences in the manner of God’s willing rather 
than in its essential content. Left ow initially takes it that allowing for 
such a fi ne-grained intrinsic diff erence in God is not destructive of divine 
simplicity, but he also acknowledges that it remains in tension with that 
doctrine, and calls for further work on the issue. 
In “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God,” Michael Rea fi rst 
argues that the terminology of the ‘hiddenness’ debate should be shift ed. 
Speaking of divine ‘silence’ rather than divine ‘hiddenness’ carries 
less negative baggage. “To say that something is hidden implies either 
that it has been deliberately concealed or that it has been concealed 
(deliberately or not) to such a degree that those from whom it is hidden 
can’t reasonably be expected to fi nd it.” (P. 80) Clarifying further, he writes 
that “God is evidently not making any special eff ort to ensure that most 
of us receive communicative content from him. A man who chooses to 
whisper rather than shout instructions to his children, knowing all the 
while that they cannot (yet) hear him over the racket they are making, 
is being silent toward his children in the sense that I have in mind. . . . 
As I understand it, then, divine silence is compatible with God’s having 
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provided some widely and readily accessible way for his creatures to fi nd 
him and to experience his presence, albeit indirectly, despite his silence” 
(P. 81). Also, Rea challenges the idea that one must come up with some 
explanation for God’s hiddenness (or silence) that explains how, in the 
end, it is actually being done for our greater well-being. In fact, the answer 
might be that, while hiddenness is done for a greater good, it’s not done 
for our greater good. Rather, it might be for the greater good that is God’s 
communicating via the modes of communication that are proper for 
Him, which may not include the kind of evidence provision (via natural 
theology and / or personal religious experience) that we expect or even 
demand. “If, as I am suggesting, divine silence is an outgrowth of the 
divine personality or of God’s preferences about how to interact with 
creatures like us, then divine silence is plausibly thought of as good in 
and of itself, or good as a means to the expression of the perfectly good 
and beautiful divine personality” (P. 86). Further, there might be reasons 
here that we just aren’t privy to. “God is as alien and ‘wholly other’ from 
us as it is possible for another person to be. Th us, it is hard to see how we 
could say with any confi dence at all what his silence indicates” (P. 83). 
But what about the fact that we suff er from this divine silence? Well, if 
it is reasonable for God to be silent, for reasons we don’t understand, then 
it is unreasonable for us to be upset about it. Rather, we should charitably 
assume that there is a good reason God is remaining silent, just as we 
would adopt such a principle of charity for a person whose modes of 
communication seemed odd to us. Further, there may be ways we can 
experience the divine silence such that it is of benefi t to us, helping us to 
grow in maturity or in our ability to relate to others (P. 87).
On top of all this, Rea is inclined to think that God does in fact 
communicate with us, just not in the direct ways we might expect. 
Th is mitigates the worry that God’s silence indicates a lack of concern 
on His part. And what are the indirect methods? Here Rea draws on 
Stump’s recent work concerning biblical narrative. Stump develops an 
account according to which narrative provides us with second-person 
experience; through narrative, another’s experience can actually be made 
available to us, and the biblical accounts supply us with potent examples 
of experience of God. Rea also suggests liturgy as another means of 
mediate experience of the divine. He further suggests that since these 
methods of divine communication are “readily and widely accessible” 
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(p. 93) we can conclude that God’s silence is not total, but only partial, 
and we can have faith that the reason behind it is a good one, even if we 
are not privy to it. 
Rea’s chapter provides a good deal of material for further refl ection 
here, particularly on the idea that God’s silence is justifi ed not because it 
furthers our well-being but because it is appropriate to or fi tting for God 
in some way. However, the reliance on narrative and liturgy to mitigate 
the worry seems problematic to me. Aft er all, for most of the human race, 
and for most of human history (and pre-history), the biblical narratives 
and Christian liturgy were wholly unknown and far from readily 
accessible. Even today they are inaccessible for a great many. (One thinks 
here of Maitzen’s demographic version of the problem of hiddenness.) 
Something more is required to buttress the account supplied by Rea – 
perhaps the notion, favoured by C. S. Lewis among others, that God 
revealed Himself, at least to a degree, in pre-Christian pagan religious 
narratives? 
Th e fi nal two essays, “Love and Damnation” by C. P. Ragland, and 
“Friendship in Heaven: Aquinas on Supremely Perfect Happiness and 
the Communion of the Saints,” by Christopher Brown, are also the two 
most impressive in the collection. Th e former provides incisive analyses 
and sympathetic critiques of the theodicies of hell provided by Stump, C. 
S. Lewis, and Richard Swinburne. Th e latter supplies both an exegetical 
tour de force, reconciling seemingly confl icting doctrines in Aquinas’ 
understanding of the beatifi c vision, and an original philosophical 
contribution in its own right. 
On the whole, a worthy tribute to a scholar who has given so much 
to the fi eld. 
